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Abstract: This paper examines the procedural fairness dimensions of 
approaches to multicultural conflicts. The paper explains the findings of 
procedural fairness research in social psychology and explores its relevance 
for the field of (human rights) law, and for the setting of multicultural 
conflicts. It argues that there are strong reasons in favour of seeking to 
optimize procedural fairness —with its criteria of participation, trustworthiness, 
neutrality and respect— across all types of procedures that address 
multicultural conflicts. The paper illustrates these criteria through three real-
life cases, concerning multicultural conflicts that occurred in Belgium in recent 
years. The paper furthermore explores the relationship between the normative 
1 This research was conducted in the context of the multi-disciplinary research 
project on “Procedural fairness in approaches to local multicultural conflicts”, sponsored 
by the Research Council of Ghent University (2016-2021). An earlier version of this 
article was presented at the Scribani-INTEGRIM Conference “International Migration, 
Integration and Social Justice”, held in Bilbao 6th-8th July 2016.
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implications that may be drawn from empirical procedural fairness research 
and existing procedural fairness norms in human rights law.
Keywords: human rights, multicultural conflicts, procedural fairness, 
Travelers, niqab, asylum seekers, racism
Resumen: Este artículo examina las dimensiones de los enfoques de la 
justicia procesal en los conflictos multiculturales. Esta propuesta explica los 
resultados de la investigación sobre la justicia procesal en la psicología social y 
explora su relevancia en el ámbito normativo de los derechos humanos y de los 
conflictos multiculturales. Se argumenta que hay razones sólidas y favorables a 
tratar de optimizar la justicia procesal siguiendo sus criterios de participación, 
confiabilidad, neutralidad y respeto en todos los tipos de procedimientos que 
abordan los conflictos multiculturales. Asimismo se ilustran estos criterios a 
través de tres casos reales relacionados con conflictos multiculturales que han 
ocurrido en Bélgica durante los últimos años. Por último, se explora la relación 
entre las implicaciones normativas que pueden extraerse de la investigación 
empírica sobre la justicia procesal y las normas existentes de justicia procesal 
en el ámbito normativo de los derechos humanos.
Palabras clave: derechos humanos, conflictos multiculturales, justicia 
procesal, niqab, nómadas, solicitantes de asilo, racismo.
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1.  Multicultural Conflicts and the Inconclusive Character of a 
Human Rights Approach
In most European societies, ethnic-cultural diversity is vastly rising, 
yielding a growing potential for multicultural conflicts, which are 
understood in this paper as disagreements with respect to cultural, 
religious or linguistic issues. This paper will approach multicultural 
conflicts from the perspective of a human rights lawyer. Detecting 
and managing latent multicultural conflicts is a very important topic, 
yet in this paper, the focus will be on manifest or acute conflicts, as 
it is generally only when a conflict becomes acute that the law, and 
in particular human rights law, is mobilized. Multicultural conflicts 
can be initiated by ethnic-cultural groups claiming recognition for 
or accommodation of “cultural” practices, or by authorities or other 
ethnic-cultural groups attempting to restrict these practices. The 
claims made by the involved parties are regularly framed in terms of 
human rights, with ethnic-cultural groups invoking the right not to 
be discriminated against, the right to live according to their culture, 
the right to practice their religion or the right to speak their mother 
tongue, and authorities or other groups advancing competing rights 
(e.g. women’s rights) or general interests that may restrict the exercise 
of human rights (e.g. state neutrality, animal welfare or social cohesion). 
Multicultural conflicts attract most scholarly attention when they are 
manifested at the macro level as a nationwide debate. Well-known 
examples are the debates around bills that would restrict religious 
practices (e.g. the French and Belgian bans on face covering aimed 
at Islamic face veils 2010/2011, or a proposal (Flanders 2016) to ban 
unstunned ritual slaughter. A large number of such conflicts, however, 
are dealt with at the meso-level of society, i.e. in local settings ranging 
from public organizations (e.g. municipal services) over semi-public 
organizations (e.g. schools, hospitals) to private organizations (e.g. 
sport clubs, private companies). If I look at my own society, Flanders, a 
number of vigorous local multicultural conflicts have made the national 
media in recent years, over issues such as the organization of religious 
slaughter during the Eid festival, the prohibition to speak a foreign 
mother tongue at the school playground, the right of employees to take 
a leave on religious holidays, bans on the wearing of religious symbols 
by municipal staff, by pupils in schools, or staff in private companies, 
and conflicts over the alleged inappropriate behaviour of men with 
a (Muslim) minority background vis-à-vis women and girls, including 
restrictions on access to outdoor swimming pools, and a proposed ban 
on male asylum seekers from a local public swimming pool.
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Human rights law frequently gets involved when multicultural 
conflicts are addressed by courts, as human rights law is entrenched 
in the highest sources of the law (constitution and international 
treaties) that take priority over other norms. In the run-up to a political 
solution for multicultural conflicts, human rights discourse may also 
play an important role. Yet human rights law does not offer an a priori 
straightforward solution to such conflicts. Take the example of bans on 
religious dress (mostly Islamic headscarves) in schools. While they are 
ruling on the basis of similar constitutional norms —the combination of 
a provision detailing religious freedom and a principle of government 
neutrality—, courts in different countries have come to diametrically 
opposite conclusions on this issue. With respect to bans for teachers in 
public schools, the German Constitutional Court ruled in 20152 that a 
blanket ban on religious expression, based on the outward appearance 
of educators was incompatible with religious freedom, whereas the 
French Conseil d’Etat ruled in 2000 that such a ban is not only 
allowed, but even mandatory.3Even more remarkably, with respect to 
bans on religious dress or symbols worn by pupils in public school, two 
supranational human rights bodies ruling on applications of the same 
French Act, came to opposite conclusions, with the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee finding a violation of religious freedom, and 
the European Court of Human Rights considering this an acceptable 
restriction of that freedom (Brems et al. 2012, 602-603).
The technical reason for this is the open character of human rights 
norms. A classical human rights provision (such as art 9 European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and article 18 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) details first the rule, in general 
terms: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance” (Article 9 (1) ECHR). 
This already leaves some room for debate, for example some will 
argue that, since many practicing Muslims do not wear a headscarf, 
2 BVerfG, Order of 27 January 2015, 1 BvR 471/10, 1 BvR 1181/10.
3 CE, advice, Mlle Marteaux, no 217017, 3 May 2000. Of course, the concept of 
state neutrality has historically been endowed with different meaning in France than in 
Germany.
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and many Islamic scholars will say that it is optional, the wearing of an 
Islamic headscarf does not fall under the protection of this provision. 
Indeed, in its first headscarf cases, concerning the obligation on 
Turkish university diplomas to have a bare-headed photograph, the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the claim to wear a 
headscarf on such a photograph was not covered by article 9 ECHR.4 
Yet today, the Court consistently refers to the perspective of the 
applicant, and the fact that she wears the headscarf on the basis of a 
religious motivation brings the claim under article 9. But that is only 
the start of the debate. After stipulating the right, a classical human 
rights provision sets out the conditions under which that right can 
legitimately be restricted: 
“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others” (Article 9 (2) ECHR). 
The central question here is, which restrictions can be considered 
“necessary in a democratic society” for the protection of a general 
interest or the rights of others, in other words, which restrictions can 
be considered proportionate for a legitimate aim. That proportionality 
analysis is something for which each adjudicating body develops its 
own ways of reasoning. Yet even when these are known, it is often 
hard to predict how such a body will assess a rights restriction that it 
has not previously addressed. 
Underlying this technical reason for the inconclusiveness of 
human rights approaches to multicultural conflicts, is of course a 
more fundamental reason, which is the lack of a worldwide, Europe-
wide or even nationwide consensus on a theory of justice governing 
multicultural relations. Opinions on what constitutes a fair solution 
for a multicultural conflict depend on one’s opinions on such issues as 
inclusion, integration and government neutrality. In many European 
societies today, these issues are among the major societal fault lines. 
Courts and parliaments are also affected by this; hence the different 
outcomes of the same balancing exercise by different bodies or even 
by the same body at different points in time. 
Even in most local settings, a consensus on a theory of multicultural 
justice is beyond reach. Any particular substantive solution to any 
4 Karaduman v Turkey, decision of 3 May 1993.
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particular multicultural conflict will be perceived as unfair by at least 
some of the stakeholders. As a result, not only does every case of 
multicultural tension become a threat to social cohesion, but also every 
substantive solution offered for such tension risks undermining social 
cohesion. 
Yet, what is often overlooked, is that in the mobilization around 
multicultural conflicts, the way in which a decision is taken and 
in which a group’s viewpoints have (or have not) been heard and 
taken into account plays a crucial role. Research has shown that 
this dimension —named “procedural fairness”— is a key factor in 
people’s acceptance of and compliance with outcomes they consider 
undesirable. The focus of this paper is on the procedural fairness 
dimensions of approaches to multicultural conflicts. One reason for this 
is the above-described stalemate that results from classical approaches 
that focus solely on outcomes. In the area of multicultural conflicts, 
it is in many cases not possible to achieve a solution that satisfies 
all stakeholders. Yet it is possible to address the matter in a manner 
that all stakeholders experience as correct, and in which nobody feels 
disrespected or excluded.
As will be explained below, doing so can help achieve very 
important goals. It should be clear however, that this paper in no way 
intends to suggest that procedural fairness should replace distributive 
fairness, or the search for fair outcomes. By all means it remains a 
priority concern to search for fairness in outcomes. The proposed 
emphasis on procedural fairness adds on to that. Procedural fairness 
and distributive justice should be seen as mutually strengthening 
approaches rather than substitutes. 
The paper will first explain the findings of procedural fairness 
research in social psychology and explore its relevance for the field of 
(human rights) law, and for the setting of multicultural conflicts (2). It 
argues that there are strong reasons in favour of seeking to optimize 
procedural fairness —with its criteria of participation, trustworthiness, 
neutrality and respect— across all types of procedures that address 
multicultural conflicts. The paper will then illustrate these criteria 
through three real-life cases, concerning multicultural conflicts 
that occurred in Belgium in recent years (3 and 4). The paper 
will furthermore explore the relationship between the normative 
implications that may be drawn from empirical procedural fairness 
research and existing procedural fairness norms in human rights 
law (5). 
In terms of method, the paper relies on multidisciplinary literature 
research in the fields of social psychology (procedural fairness) and 
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human rights law. The section on the application of procedural fairness 
to human rights law in general terms, summarizes findings of the 
author’s previous work in this field. The application of these findings 
to real-life cases applies classical legal methodology (“applying the law 
to the facts”) to standards that are themselves not of a legal nature 
but rather originate from the procedural fairness literature. The cases 
are reported on the basis of media sources (DJ Jos case and swimming 
pool case) and the results prior field research (face veil case). Finally, 
the confrontation of the procedural fairness criteria resulting from 
social psychology research with the normative criteria of procedural 
fairness that are found in human rights law, is the most innovative part 
of this paper. 
2. Procedural Fairness5
The concept of “procedural fairness” (or “procedural justice”) 
was developed by American social psychology researchers (Thibault 
and Walker 1975) and has gained worldwide recognition. Its central 
empirical finding is that in their contact with the law, people care not 
only about the outcome of their case, but that the way in which it is 
handled is also very important. In fact, the perception of procedural 
fairness (was the case dealt with in a fair manner?) is a more important 
factor determining the perception of the legitimacy of the institution 
concerned, than the perception of distributive justice (was the outcome 
of the case fair?).
Of crucial importance for the development of the theory of 
procedural justice is the work of Tom Tyler and his associates. 
According to Lind and Tyler, people value procedural justice not 
only because of the way procedures facilitate desired outcomes 
(the instrumental perspective), but primarily because a sense of 
procedural fairness provides people status recognition (the normative 
perspective) (Lind and Tyler 1998). A sense of procedural justice 
therefore has an important impact on persons’ feelings of self-worth, 
but its impact extends much further and is of crucial relevance for all 
legal institutions
5 This section follows Brems and Lavrysen (2013) and Ouald Chaib and Brems 
(2013).
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2.1. Importance of procedural fairness
Initially, procedural justice research focused on the question of 
compliance with the law. Tyler and his associates found that the 
legitimacy of an authority shapes compliance and that legitimacy is 
rooted in procedural fairness judgments (Tyler 2006, 270). Hence, 
the first reason for authorities to accord particular importance to 
procedural fairness is maintaining their own legitimacy and that of 
the law. Central to the idea of legitimacy is the belief that “some 
decision made or rule created by [the] authorities is ‘valid’ in the 
sense that it is ‘entitled to be obeyed’ by virtue of who made the 
decision or how it is made” (Tyler 2006, 277). As a consequence, 
procedural fairness also enhances cooperation with authorities.(Tyler 
2006, 271). Moreover, it promotes social cohesion and individual 
wellbeing. Research has consistently shown that “[p]eople … value 
fair treatment by legal authorities because it communicates a message 
about their identities— that they are respected and valued members 
of society” (Tyler and Huo 2002: 167) and that they can count on 
the authorities for protection, benevolence and consideration when 
needed (Tyler 2006, 175-176).
Although it follows from Tyler’s research that procedural fairness 
is equally important to majority populations as to minorities (Tyler 
and Huo 2002, 152; see also Burke and Leben 2007, 18; Tyler 2001: 
217), there are several reasons to believe that procedural fairness is 
particularly crucial for minority justice.
Firstly, overcoming minority members’ above-average distrust of 
authorities (Tyler 2006, 270; see also Tyler and Huo 2002, 142-146; 
Tyler 2001, 217; Levi et al. 2009, 369) may require particular vigilance 
on procedural fairness (Ouald Chaib 2012, 221). Secondly, perceptions 
of social standing in the society gain a special significance for minority 
members. When certain people, e.g. youth, minorities or people with 
disabilities are treated unfairly, authorities might be sending the signal 
that these groups are marginal in society (Tyler 2006, 176). In contrast, 
by treating minority individuals fairly the authorities convey a message 
of inclusion among the valued members of society. 
2.2. Components of Procedural Fairness
Tyler and others highlight four criteria, according to which people 
evaluate procedural fairness: participation, trustworthiness, neutrality 
and respect (Tyler 2007, 30).
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Participation, frequently called “voice”, represents the need of 
people to be able to express their own perspective, regardless of 
whether or not their voice will have an impact (Tyler 2007, 30; see 
also Burke and Leben 2007, 11-12). The criterion of participation 
requires that people must have “the opportunity to tell their side of 
the story in their own words before decisions are made” (“formal 
participation”) (Tyler 2007, 30). This “has a positive effect upon 
people’s experience with the legal system irrespective of their 
outcome, as long as they feel that the authority sincerely considered 
their arguments before making their decision.”(Tyler 2007, 30) 
Simply providing structural opportunities to speak therefore does not 
suffice; citizens must also infer that their views are being considered 
by the decision maker (“substantive participation”)(Tyler 2006, 149). 
In the case of an unfavourable outcome, the decision maker has 
to communicate that the citizens’ views were considered but that 
they unfortunately could not influence the decision made. Judges 
can show this by referring to parties’ arguments in the judgment 
and carefully examining the merits of the case. When people are 
confronted with an authority with which they have less direct contact, 
such as a legislator, direct voice is not so important (Gangl 2003, 
136). Yet that does not make participation irrelevant. People still 
expect their interests to be taken into account (Levi et  al. 2009, 
360). For minorities this might be of additional relevance since the 
“underrepresentation of a group in the legislature (...) may reduce the 
group members’ sense of ownership, increase their sense of injustice 
and partiality in the determination of policy, and dampen their 
obedience to authority” (Levi et al. 2009, 360).
Trustworthiness relates to an assessment of the character of the 
decision maker (Tyler 2007, 31). Citizens make motive attributions on 
whether the officials involved are motivated to be just (Tyler 1988, 
129). According to Tyler, “the key elements in this evaluation involve 
issues of sincerity and caring.” (Tyler 2007, 31) The understandability 
of the motives of authorities and the feeling of shared social bonds 
with the authorities are antecedents of trust (Tyler and Huo 2002, 
70-71). In the context of a court, trust is related to questions whether 
people feel “that court personnel, such as judges, are listening to and 
considering their views; are being honest and open about the basis 
for their actions; are trying to do what is right for everyone involved; 
and are acting in the interests of the parties, not out of personal 
prejudices.” (Tyler 2007, 31) 
Neutrality requires authorities to be honest and unbiased about 
the applicant and the case and to base their decision upon rules 
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and on objective information about the case and on the arguments 
of the parties instead of personal assumptions (Tyler 2007, 31; see 
also Tyler 2006, 164). This relates to perceptions of independence 
and impartiality of the judge, as well as to the equal treatment of all 
parties. Neutrality requires also transparency about the way decisions 
are taken and how the rules are applied (Tyler 2007, 30; see also 
Burke and Leben 2007, 6). It also involves consistency across people, 
over time and across cases(Tyler 2007, 30; see also Ouald Chaib 
2012, 223).Tyler states that “judges should be transparent and open 
about how the rules are being applied and how decisions are being 
made. Explanations emphasizing how the relevant rules are being 
applied are helpful.” (Tyler 2007, 30). For lawmakers, neutrality 
requires that the interests of the whole population are taken into 
account. All views should be considered and no one view should 
be granted an obvious advantage in the policy debate (Gangl 2003, 
121). It may be argued that particular caution should be paid to this 
when minorities are not represented in legislative bodies. Therefore, 
it is important that lawmakers be sufficiently informed on minorities’ 
interests and needs when enacting legislation that affects them. 
Other elements that play a role here are accuracy and correctness: 
judges have to base their opinion on information that is correct. 
Moreover, opportunities should exist to correct decisions that are 
unfair or incorrect (Tyler 2006, 119).6
The final criterion, respect means that people‘s human dignity is 
not infringed and that authorities treat them in a polite and respectful 
way (Burke and Leben 2007, 7; see also Tyler 2006, 152; Nussbaum 
2012, 65). People should be given the feeling that they and their 
concerns are taken seriously by the legal system (Tyler 2006, 149).They 
must be treated as persons and as valued members of society (Greacen 
2008). This criterion is particularly relevant for individuals’ feeling of 
self-worth, as mentioned above (Greacen 2008, 129).
2.3. Preliminary Conclusion
From the above, it is clear that investing in procedural fairness in 
approaches to multicultural conflicts is likely to yield positive results in 
terms of individual well-being as well as in terms of social cohesion. 
This applies both to members of ethnic or cultural minority groups 
6 Referring to the criteria developed by Leventhal (1980).
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and to members of the dominant majority. Procedural fairness is 
especially important to avoid that those on the losing end of any 
solution to a multicultural conflict fail to comply with the solution, that 
they lose trust in the authorities or in the law, or that they experience 
infringements of their self-worth or their sense of inclusion. This affects 
members of minority groups in those cases in which authorities are not 
able to accommodate their claims. It affects members of the majority in 
those cases in which authorities take measures that do accommodate 
minority claims, and which may meet with hostility on the part of the 
majority. In both cases, the negative impact of a solution that pleases 
one side but disappoints the other can be abated by well-considered 
processes that take into account the procedural fairness criteria of 
voice, trust, neutrality and respect. Simple measures such as providing 
an opportunity for stakeholders to voice their concerns, and taking the 
trouble of explaining the considerations behind the solution, can make 
a world of difference in this respect. 
Before examining how the social psychology concept of procedural 
fairness relates to the concept of procedural fairness in human rights 
law (section 5), we will first look at some illustrations of procedural 
fairness issues.
3. Cases
In order to illustrate the prima facie relevance of procedural fairness 
for overall perceptions of justice, a number of examples are presented, 
taken from real life in Belgium. In all these cases, the process leading 
up to a decision and/or the way people are treated by decision 
makers in their actions and discourse, is a crucial factor determining 
perceptions of unfairness.
3.1. Travelers illegally occupy a terrain – the DJ Jos case
In Belgium, as in several other European countries, there is a 
structural shortage of terrains for Travelers to legally park their mobile 
homes, either for a longer or a shorter period of time.7 As a result, it 
regularly happens that groups of Travelers on the move occupy public 
or private terrains (with or without the agreement of the owner) 
7 See European Committee on Social Rights, FIDH v Belgium, 31 July 2012.
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that are not intended for this purpose, i.e. without the municipality 
having issued a permit that would allow such use of that terrain. On 
a Sunday in July 2014, a group of Travelers settled with around 30 
mobile homes on an industrial terrain in the municipality of Landen. It 
is not contested that the relevant permit for this terrain was missing, 
and that hence the stay was illegal. According to media reports, 
officials claimed that they had negotiated an agreement according to 
which the group would leave on Tuesday morning. At the same time, 
a spokesperson of the group denied such agreement and said that 
the group had obtained from the owner of the terrain the right to 
stay there until Friday and that they had paid for this. On Wednesday 
morning, and under great attention of the media, the mayor had a 
local DJ (“DJ Jos”) transport a 14400 Watt musical sound equipment 
installation to the industrial terrain, and play very loud music to 
chase away the Travelers. After an hour, negotiations with the police 
resumed, resulting in an agreement that the group would leave on 
Thursday. In the media the Travelers are quoted as saying “If we need 
to leave, we will leave. But the way this was dealt with… We really 
feel that we were treated like animals”.
In terms of substantive justice (i.e. the fact that the Travelers 
were forced to leave, setting aside the issue of the intervention of 
DJ Jos), valid arguments can be made on both sides of this case. 
In the absence of the required permit, it is clear that the Travelers 
—and in the first place the owner of the terrain— violated Belgian 
law, and that the police were entitled to force them to leave. 
Yet if this decision were challenged before a judge on human 
rights grounds, it could turn either way. The judge might follow 
the reasoning of the European Committee of Social Rights, that 
has found that states parties have a human rights obligation to 
make available a sufficient number of sites for Travelers.8 A judge 
might hold that the violation of this human rights obligation by 
the Belgian state justifies renting/hiring a terrain for temporary 
stationing of mobile homes without a permit, if it can be proven 
that there was no possibility for this group of Travelers to legally 
station their mobile homes elsewhere, on account of the shortage of 
sites. That would mean that the Travelers would win the case. Yet, 
a judge may also choose to frame her/his human rights reasoning 
purely in terms of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights; which has held that under the ECHR, there is no obligation 
8 European Committee on Social Rights, FIDH v Belgium, 31 July 2012.
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on states to provide a sufficient number of sites for mobile homes.9 
That would mean that the municipality would win the case. In other 
words, in terms of substantive justice, this is not a clear-cut case. 
Yet in terms of procedural fairness, it is clear that in this case the 
approach of the mayor displayed gross disrespect for the dignity 
of human beings. In substantive terms, the mayor had to choose 
between a solution (making the Travelers leave) that he knew the 
Travelers would perceive of as unfair (given the shortage of “legal” 
sites) and a solution (tolerating the presence of the Travelers) that 
he knew the local inhabitants would perceive of as unfair (given the 
illegality of the situation). In that sense, he would in any case be 
unable to satisfy all stakeholders. Yet the point is that whatever the 
solution he chose, it was possible to implement it without violating 
anyone’s human dignity. Ultimately, what hurt the Travelers’ sense 
of justice most, was not that they had to leave, but that they were 
treated “like animals”.
3.2. Local and nationwide face covering bans
Before the introduction of a criminal ban on face covering in 
public in 2011,10 there were approximately 200 Muslim women in 
Belgium (population ca. 11M) who wore a niqab (face veil). Before 
the nationwide ban, many of these women were already affected by 
municipal bans prescribing administrative sanctions. Typically, as soon 
as some citizens complained of the sight of a niqab in the street, the 
municipality reacted with a ban. For example, in the police zone of 
Vesdre (the area of the city of Verviers), a proposal for introducing a 
face covering ban in the police ordinance was introduced as follows: 
“A few cases of wearing the burqa (wearing a long dark veil that 
completely covers the head and body of the Muslim woman, covering 
the largest part of her face) were noted in Verviers, on public streets 
and in several public places. This seems to shock the population or 
even generate feelings of unsafety. …. (the current ordinance) does 
not seem to us sufficient to ban and fight this practice in an effective 
manner…”. The proposal was adopted in June 2008, without any 
9 ECtHR, Chapman v UK, 18 January 2001.
10 The Belgian Act of 1 June 2011 instituting a prohibition on wearing clothing 
that covers the face, or a large part of it” (Loi visant à interdire le port de tout 
vêtement cachant totalement ou de manière principale le visage) came into force on 
13 July 2011.
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contact with the women concerned. In our study based on interviews 
with women who wore the face veil in Belgium (Brems et al. 2012),11a 
face veil wearer from Verviers explains that after she learned through 
the media that a local ban was about to be voted, she tried to enter 
into contact with the mayor to propose a compromise solution, that 
would address the problem of feelings of unsafety. She proposed 
amongst others to wear colours, if it was the black colour that 
shocked people; or to only go out accompanied by an identifiable 
person, such as her husband, in case identifiability was the issue. 
Yet she never received a reply, and was not successful in starting a 
dialogue on the matter. Asked for her opinion about the people who 
had created this ban, she stated “I think they are ill-informed. There 
is also a lack of communication… Before making these rules, they 
have not tried to understand, I am sure of that. In any case in our 
zone there has not been any dialogue or communication.” Strikingly, 
this woman thus identifies a problematic process as the cause of a 
problematic outcome.
The nationwide ban12 was also adopted without any effort to 
reach out to the niqab wearers themselves; moreover a formal request 
for expert hearings in the parliament was rejected. In the run-op to 
the ban, the political and societal discourse about the niqab was very 
hostile; at the same time considering niqab wearers as victims of the 
oppression of women by Islam, and as symbols of an undesirable 
fundamentalist Islam that rejects “our values”. Our interviewees 
expressed a strong concern about the impact of the ban on their daily 
lives. In addition to the practical and principled aspects (including 
islamophobia and the violation of their human rights), many expressed 
a feeling that they had not been respected, stating that they felt that 
the purpose of the ban was to “humiliate” or “crush” them, and 
to “reduce them to less than nothing” (Brems et  al. 2012, 33-34). 
11 The empirical research consisted mainly of semi-structured in-depth 
interviews, aimed at getting insights in the lived realities of the interviewees. The 
interviews included questions on how and why the women started to wear the face 
veil, and on their experiences while wearing it. In addition, we wanted to know how 
the women related to the local and (pending) general bans, and to the arguments 
that were put forward to introduce these. We interviewed 27 women between 
September 2010 and September 2011. In addition we organized two focus groups 
in April and May 2012 – one in Brussels in French and one in Antwerp in Dutch, in 
which 9 women participated, two of whom had not been previously interviewed for 
this study.
12 For a detailed assessment of the Belgian and French face covering bans from a 
perspective of procedural fairness, see Ouald Chaib and Brems (2013).
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Moreover, a prominent finding in the study is the interviewees’ 
frustration that this political intervention in their lives took place 
without any knowledge of their lives and without consulting them or 
researching their situation. They specifically mention the politicians’ 
lack of knowledge about Islam, and about the situation of the women 
concerned. Several women expressed disappointment that in the 
democratic society of which they feel a part, their opinion was not 
asked, and that “they don’t know us, or they don’t want to know us” 
(Brems et al. 2012, 35).
On the substance, the Belgian Constitutional Court found no 
fault with the face covering ban.13 Two cases before the European 
Court of Human Rights are pending,14 yet the unanimous clearing of 
the French “burqa ban” by a Grand Chamber of the Court15 suggests 
the probability that the Belgian ban will pass European human rights 
scrutiny as well. At the same time, academic commentators have 
overwhelmingly rejected the ban as a human rights violation. There 
is manifestly no consensus on this matter: the women affected are 
harmed by the ban and perceive it as unfair, yet if the ban were 
withdrawn, many other individuals would feel aggrieved by what 
they perceive as symbols of subordination. However, it can hardly 
be sustained that it would have harmed anyone to have included 
in the decision-making process room for consultation, dialogue, or 
at least expertise. Arguably this might have led to a different type 
of measures16 or at least to restating the objectives of the ban. 
Indeed, a crucial misunderstanding in the political and public debate 
was the assumption that the large majority of face veil wearers in 
Belgium were forced or at least pressurized into wearing the veil. 
Our study —in line with studies in other European countries— 
found that instead the large majority of these women take a very 
autonomous decision that is even in many cases met with negative 
13 Belgian Constitutional Court, 6 December 2012, no. 145/2012.
14 Belkacemi and Oussar v Belgium App no 37798/13 and Dakir v Belgium App no 
4619/12.
15 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, SAS v France, 1 July 2014.
16 This happened in Denmark. The Danish government was considering the possible 
introduction of a face covering ban, and ordered a study into the practice: “Rapport 
om brugen af niqab og burka”, Institute of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, 
University of Copenhagen, 2009, at www.e-pages.dk/ku/322/. After reading the study, 
“politicians and the public quickly lost interest in the issue of niqabis, mainly because 
there were so few of them and that half of them were ethnic Danish converts. The 
Danish government… announced two minor modifications of existing law.” (Østergaard 
et al. 2014, 72).
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reactions in their close environment. As a result, the law does 
not further its stated goal of fighting the subordination of these 
women, and instead violates their autonomy. In addition, the law 
does not further its stated goal of furthering social integration, as 
many of these women, who are very much attached to their veil, 
choose to stay indoors after the ban, and hence find their social 
lives and everyday interactions much reduced. Hence, in addition to 
generating frustration and feelings of injustice among the affected 
women, the process leading up to the legislative intervention has 
also partly frustrated the goals of that intervention.
3.3. The asylum seeker in the swimming pool
In the context of the asylum crisis of 2015-2016, a temporary 
open asylum facility was organized in the coastal municipality of 
Koksijde, hosting 400 asylum seekers. On a Saturday in January 
2016, the national media were alerted about an incident in which 
an Iraqi asylum seeker had grabbed hold of a 10 year old girl in the 
swimming pool. Two witnesses had alerted the pool guards, who in 
turn called the police to report this incident which they described 
as sexual harassment or even assault. The man was interrogated by 
the police, but the police saw no ground to arrest him. His story, 
that he had wanted to calm the girl who was panicking before 
the water slides, seemed plausible. The girl and her parents did 
not submit a complaint. The parents stated in the media that they 
thought the incident had been over-dramatized. Immediately on the 
day of the incident however, the Minister for Asylum affairs used his 
administrative power to transfer the man to a closed asylum center 
(i.e. asylum detention), stating that “we should act vigorously against 
infringements of physical integrity”. Moreover the mayor of Koksijde 
announced that he wanted to ban adult (male) asylum seekers from 
access to the municipal swimming pool. That plan was abandoned 
two days later “after learning that it was legally impossible”. After 
ten days in detention, the Iraqi asylum seeker was released upon 
order of a judge, yet he was not allowed to return to the asylum 
center of Koksijde (he was brought to another open asylum center). 
Twelve days after the incident the prosecutor formally announced 
that there would be no prosecution, as there was no evidence that 
any offence had been committed. 
Most people will agree that there has been unfairness in this 
case. The heart of this unfairness relates not to the outcome, nor to 
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the individual’s treatment by the police or the justice system —it is 
inevitable that sometimes individuals are wrongly suspected of an 
offence. Yet the man was not arrested after interrogation, and was 
never an official suspect, and after investigation the case was closed. 
So the police and the justice system treated him properly. Yet the use 
of the Minister’s administrative power to detain the man can only 
have been experienced by him as the infliction of punishment without 
investigation and without a chance to defend himself. Moreover, in a 
democracy it is inevitable that there is media coverage of an alleged 
offence. The man could not expect to be protected against that. Yet 
the discourse of the mayor of Koksijde fed an aggressive animosity, not 
only against the suspect, but against the entire group of male asylum 
seekers. 
4. Illustrating Procedural Fairness Issues
This section will attempt to link the prima facie procedural fairness 
problems in the three cases that were presented above, to the 
procedural fairness criteria that result from empirical scholarship. The 
examples will show moreover that in practice, these criteria are strongly 
interrelated.
4.1. Participation
Participation is a central issue in the “burqa ban” case. This case 
involved measures specifically targeting a small group of individuals, 
yet no efforts were undertaken to contact these people or to contact 
persons who are familiar with this group. Worse, an effort on their 
side to reach out was ignored and a proposal to consult experts was 
rejected. This is all the more remarkable given the fact that Belgium 
has a strong tradition of consulting with target groups in the run-up 
to law making. The derogation from democratic custom in this specific 
case cannot go unnoticed, neither by the women themselves, nor by 
the population at large. Among the women, this results in frustration 
because their side of the story remains untold, and more broadly in 
feelings of being ignored, of not counting in the eyes of decision 
makers, hence of exclusion.
In the DJ Jos case, some negotiation had taken place, so the 
Travelers had been able to voice their point of view. This point of view 
was that they had permission of the owner and that they expected to 
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be able to stay for the number of days they had paid rent for. If their 
point of view had been taken seriously, one would have expected 
the municipality to look into this aspect of the case and address the 
owner of the terrain before taking any further steps with respect to the 
Travelers. Yet the owner remained completely out of view throughout 
the incident, and the authorities targeted only the Travelers. Hence it 
would seem that this case as well presents a problem with respect to 
the participation criterion.
In the swimming pool case, the point of view of the asylum seeker 
was heard and given due weight by the police. Yet the procedural 
fairness problems in this case resulted not from the police investigation 
or the judiciary, but from the parallel interventions of politicians in the 
case. Participation was one of the problems in this case: The Minister 
took his detention decision without hearing the man’s point of view, 
and the mayor drew far-reaching conclusions (the proposal to ban 
asylum seekers from the pool) without caring for this man’s or any 
asylum seeker’s point of view. 
4.2. Trustworthiness
The same behaviour on behalf of the political actors in the 
“swimming pool” case, can be characterized as shortcomings of 
trustworthiness, in the sense that in their behaviour toward/about 
the applicant, these actors did not express either sincerity or caring. 
Arguably, these politicians acted from a strong desire to communicate 
an image of caring, yet this would be partisan caring, i.e. caring about 
the feelings of the regular citizens of Koksijde using the swimming pool 
(the mayor) or of the average Belgian citizen who feels uncomfortable 
in the presence of Muslim men. They thus knowingly contributed to 
the stigmatization of this group.
Similarly, in the DJ Jos case, the authorities’ could not plausibly be 
perceived as caring toward the Travelers. They completely disregarded 
the fact that the group had paid rent to the owner of the terrain, and 
when they decided to use force to enforce their decision, they opted 
for an approach that was at the same time extremely antagonistic 
and very public, both because of the means itself (loud music attracts 
attention) and because of its unusual character, which attracted 
massive media attention, and thus contributed to public stigmatization 
of Travelers. 
To the extent that the authorities in the face veil banning process 
show caring, it is likewise caring about the majority population, 
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for whom the face veil may engender feelings of insecurity, who 
dislike the sight of a face veil on the street, and who see the face 
veil as a symbol denying women’s rights. The lack of caring for the 
women concerned is most flagrant in the fact that the Belgian law, 
as –  different from the French law  – does not include a stipulation 
against forcing a person to cover her face. While the authors of 
the ban were assuming that women wearing the face veil are 
coerced to do so, they apparently did not care enough about these 
women to punish the perpetrators. Manifestly the only problems the 
lawmakers cared about are those of the majority population. At a 
more institutional level, the refusal of the Belgian lawmakers to hear 
experts or consult the Council of State, or the anti-discrimination 
watchdog,17 or even to seriously engage with any arguments against 
the ban (Delgrange 2013), can be seen as evidence of lack of caring, 
in the sense that the focus on getting a ban voted, left no room for 
even the most common efforts aimed at doing things in a proper 
way. It was quite clear that the parliamentarians did not want to 
have to deal with criticism. One of the main proponents of the ban 
explicitly stated that the reason for avoiding the Council of State was 
the fear that it might find inconsistencies with fundamental rights. In 
other words, in their hurry to get the ban voted, politicians did not 
even care about fundamental rights (Delgrange 2013).
4.3. Neutrality
What is described above as “partisan caring” —i.e. showing care 
for the majority population, but not for the minority— is of course also 
a problem of neutrality, that affects all three cases.
In the DJ Jos case, neutrality is violated in addition by the fact that 
the authorities targeted exclusively the group of Travelers, and left 
the owner of the terrain in peace, while he was in fact the principal 
perpetrator, as it is the owner who would be expected to obtain a 
permit for the municipality before renting his property for the purpose 
of living there in mobile homes.
Moreover, for lawmakers, the requirement of neutrality comes 
close to those of sincerity and transparence. It is about being clear 
on the purpose of the legislation, and seriously striving to best 
achieve that purpose. In the case of conflicting interests between 
17 The Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism.
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different categories of people affected by the law, it is also about 
taking the interests of all categories equally seriously. The local and 
nationwide “burqa bans” pretend at neutrality, in that literally, they 
ban face covering in general, not the Islamic face veil specifically. 
The neutral wording is intended chiefly to avoid legal challenges of 
discrimination on grounds of religion. Yet it goes at the expense of 
sincerity and transparency. The Belgian legislator has been accused 
of hypocrisy for disguising the real objective of the law (Delgrange 
2013). The legislators’ desire to “appear impartial and reasonable” 
(Winet 2012, 244) extended to the parliamentary debates, where 
parliamentarians avoided as much as possible mentioning Islam. Yet 
they did not fool the face veil wearers, who interpreted the message 
as “they are simply against Islam” (Brems et al. 2012: 34). Another 
key problem in the “burqa ban” case concerns accuracy, a criterion 
that is also related to neutrality (cf. supra).This means simply that the 
law has to be based on information that is correct. In this respect, 
both the local and nationwide “burqa bans” are seriously flawed. 
Several commentators have noted that in the legislative process, 
no evidence was adduced that would allow to identify the exact 
problem the law would remedy, nor to support the claim that the 
specific remedy —i.e. the ban— would be effective with respect to 
that problem (Leane 2011, 1053; see also Hunter-Henin 2012, 623; 
Nanwani 2011, 1464). The Belgian legislator was rather well tuned 
in with majority sentiments vis-à-vis the face veil, yet was working 
on erroneous assumptions concerning the profiles and experiences 
of women wearing the face veil.18 As summarized supra, the finding 
that the assumption of coercion is wrong renders moot some of the 
arguments used by politicians to justify the ban. The fact that the 
authorities literally had no idea what they were dealing with19 thus 
had important consequences for the impact of the ban. Disregarding 
essential evidence in the course of law making is highly problematic; 
it is even more so when it concerns legislation restricting fundamental 
rights. Moreover, the disregard seems deliberate, as Parliament 
insisted on moving fast, and in that spirit rejected both a request 
for the hearing of experts who could have advanced evidence, and 
requests for an advice of the Council of State, who could have 
18 For an extensive discussion of the erroneous assumptions of the Belgian legislator 
as confronted with empirical reality, see Brems et al. (2014).
19 About the Netherlands: Witteveen, Willem, “Montesquieu en het boerkaverbod”, 
20 May 2010, at http://njblog.nl/2010/05/20/montesquieu-en-het-boerkaverbod/. (Last 
accessed on 31/10/2012)
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checked whether the proponents of the ban advanced sufficient 
evidence to support their arguments. 
Yet it is arguably in the swimming pool case, that disrespect of 
the neutrality criterion had the most serious consequences, as it led to 
deprivation of liberty. The Minister, in using his administrative powers 
to detain the asylum seeker at a moment when the police had already 
assessed his version of the events as credible, can only be perceived as 
acting upon a presumption of guilt, as opposed to the presumption of 
innocence, which is one of the ways in which neutrality is guaranteed 
in judicial procedures (cf. infra). Moreover, the mayor’s discourse and 
proposal to ban all adult male asylum seekers from the swimming pool, 
goes even further on this road by treating an entire category of persons 
as a priori guilty. 
4.4. Respect
The same facts in the “swimming pool” case also show lack of 
respect. The respect criterion is about taking people seriously and 
treating them as valued members of society. The reaction of the local 
as well as national politicians in this case has instead been to treat 
the asylum seeker or even all asylum seekers, as a threat to society. 
In their actions they made clear that the category of valued members 
of society that deserve respect does not include (male, adult) asylum 
seekers.
In the face veil case, the “respect” problem relates to what 
has been called “a neo-colonial form of paternalism” (Hennette-
Vauchez 2010). It is strongly linked to the problem of participation, as 
summarized supra. The authorities do not take these women seriously. 
Throughout their discourse, they picture them as submitted, dependent 
creatures. Moreover, the authorities dwell extensively on how the 
majority in society experience the encounter of a face veil or even the 
idea of a face veil, yet show no interest in knowing how women who 
wear it experience their encounters with others. They thus ignore the 
women behind the veil, denying them humanity.
The worst violation of the criterion of respect is of course found in 
the DJ Jos case. A group of families who intended to live for a limited 
period of time (less than a week) in their mobile homes on a terrain 
they had rented in an agreement with the owner, were chased with 
loud music, under massive media attention. It is hard to conceive how 
such treatment might not be intended to degrade these people, to 
affect their human dignity, to de-humanize them.
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5. Procedural Fairness and Procedural Human Rights 
Procedural fairness is an important concern in human rights law. 
Several human rights provisions specifically protect procedural rights. In 
addition, human rights bodies have interpreted state obligations under 
substantive rights provisions in such a manner as to include procedural 
obligations (Brems 2013, 137-161). The grounds for valuing procedural 
fairness in human rights law are not necessarily the same as the 
benefits of procedural fairness that were detailed supra on the basis of 
empirical research (5.1). It is therefore worth exploring to what extent 
the ways in which procedural fairness has been concretely developed 
in human rights law coincide with what empirical procedural fairness 
research has identified as concrete procedural fairness criteria that help 
generate these benefits (5.2).
5.1. Grounds for valuing procedural fairness in human rights law
Traditionally, in human rights law, procedural fairness is both 
valued for its own sake (process value), and as a means for obtaining 
good outcomes (process efficacy).20
5.1.1. Autonomous Process VAlue
Human Rights law attaches autonomous value to a decent judicial 
process. The right to a fair trial is a human right, not only in the ECHR, 
but in international human rights law as a whole, as well as in domestic 
bills of rights. In the ECHR, the right to a fair trial is developed in some 
detail, including multiple sub-rights, in article 6. This is by far the most 
frequently invoked provision of the ECHR. An overview of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ case law until 2011 shows that no less than 45 
% of its judgments concerned article 6.
Additional procedural guarantees relating to court procedures 
are found in article 5 ECHR with respect to arrest and detention and 
in ECHR Protocol N° 7 with respect to the right of appeal in criminal 
matters (Article 2), compensation for wrongful conviction (Article 3) 
and the right not to be tried or punished twice (Article 4).
Moreover, the ECHR and its additional protocols include a number 
of specific procedural rights that do not exclusively concern courts 
20 In addition, a procedural interpretation of substantive rights may be linked 
to judicial restraint, or – as in the case of the European Court of Human Rights, an 
expression of subsidiarity vis-à-vis domestic authorities. See Brems and Gerards (2017).
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but rather extend to administrative remedies. In particular, article 13 
ECHR enshrines the right to a remedy in case of a violation of another 
Convention right, and article 1 of Protocol 7 provides procedural 
safeguards relating to the expulsion of aliens. 
When it comes to administrative decision-making or parliamentary 
process, a similar elevation of standards of good procedure to 
human rights cannot be found in the ECHR. Yet a broader look at 
international human rights standards reveals that a fundamental right 
to fair treatment by administrative bodies has gained recognition 
internationally. In particular, it has been enshrined in Article 41 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Hence there 
can be little doubt about the relevance of attaching autonomous 
process value to fair procedures before administrative bodies.
Zooming in on parliamentary process, it is clear that here as 
well a strong case for process value can be made, as the value of 
good parliamentary process is directly related to the value of a well-
functioning democratic system. 
5.1.2. the Process efficAcy rAtionAle
The classical instrumental reason for valuing the quality of process 
conceives of good process as an important way to guarantee good 
outcomes. In a human rights context, good outcomes signify domestic 
norms, decisions, actions and inactions that respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights.
With respect to the European Court of Human Rights, Christoffersen 
stated:
“Procedural obligations that only have process value do not add 
anything to the effective implementation of the ECHR. The end 
purpose of proceduralization is to implement the ECHR in domestic 
law. The effective implementation by means of procedural obligations 
thus logically presupposes an obligation to apply the substantive 
content of the ECHR in the course of the proscribed procedures” 
(Christoffersen 2009, 463).
In a 2014 overview paper of the Court’s tendency to “proceduralise” 
substantive rights, I found that whenever the Court motivated its turn 
to proceduralisation, it did so on the basis of efficacy arguments. It 
would seem that from the perspective of the Court, the identification 
and scope of procedural obligations under substantive rights are 
in most cases designed to optimize protection of substantive rights 
(Brems 2013, 159).
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When it comes to judicial process, the instrumental process efficacy 
rationale is prominent even when decent procedures have been made 
the object of autonomous human rights, as in article 6 ECHR. For 
example, one important reason why there has to be equality of arms 
and a right to an attorney is because this will increase the quantity and 
quality of factual claims and legal arguments before the judge, who 
is therefore in a better position to make a good judgment. Likewise, 
one of the reasons why judges have to be impartial and independent 
is because it is considered that sheltering judges from the interference 
of factors that are not related to the merits of the case is important to 
reach a good outcome in that case. 
In relation to administrative decision-making, the process efficacy 
rationale is no less relevant. In fact, historically fundamental rights 
have been conceived in the first place as checks on the exercise of 
administrative power by kings or feudal lords. This function directly 
translates into a procedural rule: the ECtHR has often requested 
guarantees against the arbitrary use of administrative powers (Gerards 
2017). This appears to emanate from a process efficacy rationale, the 
assumption being that arbitrariness in the exercise of administrative 
powers will lead to violations of human rights. Similarly, many of the 
specific positive obligations concerning administrative process that the 
ECtHR has stated are manifestly aimed at the prevention of human rights 
violations. This is the case for example in the context of the regulation of 
hazardous activities that may threaten the right to life,21 or with respect 
to secret surveillance that may interfere with the right to privacy.22
Regarding the quality of parliamentary process, there can be little 
doubt that the process efficacy rationale applies as well. The very 
concept of a parliamentary democracy relies —amongst others— 
on certain premises of process efficacy, i.e. the idea that certain 
procedural features such as broad representation and checks and 
balances improve the quality of outcomes. 
5.2. Normative and empirical procedural fairness: a partial overlap
Against this background, the value of procedural fairness that 
is demonstrated by empirical procedural fairness research, i.e. 
the positive impact of procedural fairness on wellbeing and social 
cohesion amongst others, can be integrated in the classical normative 
21 E.g. ECtHR, Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 8 April 2010, para. 81.
22 E.g. ECtHR, Petkova.o. v. Bulgaria, 11 June 2009, para. 63.
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discourse on procedural fairness: it can be seen both as a strong 
reason to value fair process for its own sake, and as an additional 
instrumental reason (in addition to the impact of fair process on 
fair outcomes) for valuing fair process. Most importantly however, 
empirical procedural fairness research provides scientifically sound 
cues as to how to design procedural fairness norms and guidelines 
for maximum beneficial effect. Across different settings, research has 
emphasized the importance of the same set of procedural fairness 
criteria, summarized supra as participation, trustworthiness, neutrality 
and respect. The current section briefly checks procedural fairness 
standards as developed in human rights law (specifically in ECHR law) 
against these criteria.
5.2.1. oVerlAP between normAtiVe And emPiricAl ProcedurAl fAirness
Procedural fairness norms in human rights law include numerous 
elements that are not as such highlighted in the procedural fairness 
literature, such as (under article 6 ECHR) the public character of the 
hearing, the equality of arms, timeliness, and the right to an attorney.23
Where they do overlap with empirical procedural fairness criteria, 
however, it is to be noted that procedural fairness norms in human 
rights law have a limited scope. Article 6 ECHR applies only to judicial 
procedures and the proceduralisation of substantive human rights is 
an inconsistent practice that manifests in some lines of case law only. 
Empirical procedural fairness research has however confirmed the 
relevance of its findings across a very wide range of settings in which 
people are confronted with authority. In the case law of the ECtHR, the 
criteria of participation and neutrality are well developed. However, the 
criteria of trustworthiness (sincerity and caring) and respect have not as 
such been translated into procedural human rights norms. 
Participation
Under article 6 ECHR, the ECtHR has developed the right to 
participate effectively at the hearing as an aspect of the right to a fair 
hearing (Harris et  al. 2009): “(T)his includes, inter alia, not only his 
23 Yet some of these criteria can be linked to some of the empirical procedural 
fairness criteria. For example, the right to an attorney is an important factor to enable 
participation in a trial. Moreover, the fact that these factors have not been studied (yet) 
in empirical procedural fairness studies, thus not mean that they may not be relevant for 
procedural fairness perceptions. Further qualitative research is needed for this purpose.
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right to be present, but also to hear and follow the proceedings.”24 
The requirement of effective participation is not limited to criminal 
matters. According to the Court: “Article 6 of the Convention does not 
guarantee the right to personal presence before a civil court but rather 
a more general right to present one’s case effectively before the court 
and to enjoy equality of arms with the opposing side.”25 This is not 
merely a question of “formal”, but also of “substantive participation”. 
In the case of Perez v. France, the Court held that the right to a fair 
trial “can only be seen to be effective if the observations are actually 
‘heard’, that is duly considered by the trial court. In other words, the 
effect of Article 6 is, among others, to place the ‘tribunal’ under a duty 
to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and 
evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of 
whether they are relevant.”26
The right to participate effectively in a trial, implicitly included in 
Article 6 of the ECHR, contributes significantly to the implementation 
of the participation criterion of the procedural justice model in a judicial 
context. Effective participation might be facilitated inter alia by special 
measures when minors face criminal charges27 or by the award of free 
legal aid.28 The purpose of these measures should be to enhance the 
understanding by the citizens concerned of the proceedings in which 
they are involved, thereby enabling them to make sure that their 
concerns are adequately represented. 
Under substantive ECHR provisions, the ECtHR has also regularly 
found procedural obligations with respect to stakeholder participation. 
This has in particular been the case under article 8 ECHR (the right 
to protection of private life, family life, home and correspondence). 
24 ECtHR, 23 Feb. 1994, Stanford v. The United Kingdom, § 26.
25 ECtHR, 21 Dec. 2010, Gladkiy v. Russia, § 103.Seealso ECtHR, 15 February 2005, 
Steel and Morris v. The United Kingdom, § 59.
26  ECtHR, (Grand Chamber), 12 February 2004, Perez v. France, § 80
27 ECtHR, (Grand Chamber), 16 Dec. 1999, T v. The United Kingdom, § 84; ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber), 16 Dec. 1999, V v. The United Kingdom, § 86; ECtHR, 15 June 2004, 
SC v. The United Kingdom, § 29
28 In criminal cases, ECHR art. 6, § 3 (c), explicitly guarantees the right to a 
defendant, “if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free 
when the interests of justice so require.” Whether free legal assistance is in the interests 
of justice depends of the seriousness of the offence, the severity of the sentence and 
the complexity of the case (ECtHR, 24 May 1991, Quaranta v. Switzerland, § 33-34). 
In civil cases, free legal aid to ensure effective participation might under certain 
circumstances implicitly stem from the general notion of “a fair trial (e.g. ECtHR, 9 
Oct. 1979, Airey v. Ireland, § 26; ECtHR, 15 Feb. 2005, Steel and Morris v. The United 
Kingdom, § 61 and § 72).
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Participation has been a consistent and prominent feature in cases 
about access and custody rights. In such cases, the Court examines, 
as part of the proportionality assessment, whether the applicants 
(generally the parents) have been properly involved in the decision-
making process and whether that process provided them with the 
requisite protection of their interests.29 This implies amongst others 
an obligation on the authorities to make available to the parents, on 
their own motion, the relevant information on the basis of which the 
decision is taken.30 Moreover, in these cases the Court has emphasized 
the participation of children in the procedure.31 Furthermore, a general 
appreciation of the fairness of a decision-making process, based on 
the statement that “the decision-making process leading to measures 
of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect for the 
interests of the individual as safeguarded by Article 8” spread from 
“family life” cases to other cases under article 8, dealing with issues 
such as planning and environment,32 deprivation of legal capacity,33 
data registration,34 registration of ethnic identity,35 and access to 
abortion.36 In the latter context, the Court has specified that “the 
relevant procedure should guarantee to a pregnant woman at least the 
possibility to be heard in person and to have her views considered”.37 
Participation in a procedure in order to defend one’s point of view is 
considered also under other provisions when the fairness of a decision-
making procedure is assessed, such as under article 1 P1(property 
right).38 In medical decision-making, the Court requires a procedure 
that guarantees informed consent of the patient.39 In an investigation 
into a death that may constitute a violation of article 2 ECHR (right to 
life), the Court requires the involvement of the victim’s next-of-kin in 
the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate 
interests.40 Under article 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture and of inhuman 
29 ECtHR (GC), K. and T. v. Finland, 12 July 2001, para. 173.
30 ECtHR (GC), T.P. and K.M. v. United Kingdom, 10 May 2001, paras. 80-82.
31 ECtHR, Saviny v Ukraine, 18 December 2008, para. 51.
32 ECtHR (GC), Hattona.o. v. United Kingdom, 8 July 2003, para. 99.
33 ECtHR, Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, 13 October 2009, para.143.
34 ECtHR, Turek v. Slovakia, 14 February 2006, para. 111.
35 ECtHR, Ciubotaru v. Moldova, 27 April 2010, para. 51.
36 ECtHR, R.R. v. Poland, 26 May 2011, para. 191.
37 ECtHR, P. and S. v. Poland, 30 October 2012, para.99.
38 ECtHR, Megadat.com srl v. Moldova, 8 April 2008, para. 73.
39 ECtHR, V.C. v. Slovakia, 8 November 2011, para. 112 (under article 3 ECHR); 
ECtHR, Csoma v. Romania, 15 January 2013, para.42 (under article 8 ECHR).
40 ECtHR (GC), Al-Skeini, para. 167.
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or degrading treatment), the victim should be able to participate in the 
investigation.41
Neutrality
The text of article 6 ECHR explicitly provides a guarantee of 
impartiality. In its extensive case-law on this issue, the Court has 
established a high standard, in particular through an objective test that 
requires the absence of legitimate doubt as to a judge’s impartiality 
(Harris et al. 2009). Moreover, article 6 § 2 stipulates the presumption 
of innocence, which is another expression of the need to avoid bias.
Additional impartiality requirements have been read into substantive 
ECHR provisions. When the Court has stipulated a requirement for the 
state to investigate allegations of human rights violations or to provide 
remedies where such violations have occurred, it has required these to 
be before a body that is both independent and impartial.42
Article 6, § 1 of the ECHR moreover guarantees a certain extent of 
consistency in civil and criminal proceedings, by linking this criterion 
to the requirements of judicial certainty and fairness. The Vincˇic´ case 
concerned claims for an employment-related benefit that were rejected 
by the domestic court, while other identical claims were simultaneously 
accepted. The Court noted:
[T]hat whilst certain divergences in interpretation could be accepted 
as an inherent trait of any judicial system which, just like the 
Serbian one, is based on a network of trial and appeal courts with 
authority over a certain territory, in the cases at hand the conflicting 
interpretations stemmed from the same jurisdiction ... and involved 
the inconsistent adjudication of claims brought by many persons in 
identical situations. ... Since these conflicts were not institutionally 
resolved, all this created a state of continued uncertainty, which in 
turn must have reduced the public’s confidence in the judiciary, such 
confidence, clearly, being one of the essential components of a State 
based on the rule of law. The Court, therefore, considers that the 
judicial uncertainty in question has in itself deprived them of a fair 
hearing.43
41 ECtHR (GC), El Masri, para. 185.
42 E.g. the protection of journalistic sources: ECtHR (GC) Sanoma Uitgevers bv, 
para. 109.
43 ECtHR, 1 Dec. 2009, Vincˇic´ and Others v. Serbia, § 56.See also ECtHR, (Grand 
Chamber), 20 October 2011, Nejdet S¸ahin and Perihan S¸ahin v. Turkey, § 57; ECtHR, 
6 Dec. 2007, Beian v Romania (no. 1), § 36-39; ECtHR 24 Mar. 2009, Tudor Tudor v. 
Romania, § 29; ECtHR, 2 July 2009, Iordan Iordanov and Others v. Bulgaria, § 47-53.
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While Article 6, § 1 ECHR thus requires consistency within the 
case-law of a single domestic court, it seems that the Court allows 
some room for divergence among different domestic courts, as 
long as they do not engage in an interpretation of the law that is 
arbitrary, unreasonable or of a nature to endanger the fairness of 
the proceedings.44 The Court appears to be particularly lenient on 
inconsistent case-law of lower judges when a high court eventually 
clarifies the law.45
The ECtHR has also emphasized the criterion of accuracy. The 
Court has repeatedly required that decisions or actions of public 
authorities that impact upon fundamental rights not be taken lightly, 
in the sense that all relevant information necessary for taking a well-
considered decision or course of action should be available and should 
be taken into account. This requirement is particularly prominent in 
cases concerning planning decisions with significant environmental 
impact. In these cases, the Court splits its article 8 ECHR reasoning 
into a substantive part and a procedural part. In the latter, the Court 
will examine amongst others which studies have been undertaken or 
consulted, arguing that 
“a governmental decision-making process concerning complex 
issues of environmental and economic policy … must necessarily 
involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to allow them 
to strike a fair balance between the various conflicting interests at 
stake”.46
Similar concerns are expressed in different areas of case law. 
Concerning the planning of an arrest operation —and in particular 
the potential need to use firearms—, the Court has stated that 
the “absolute minimum” information to be analysed concerns “the 
nature of the offence committed by the person to be arrested and 
the degree of danger —if any— posed by that person.”47 The Court 
examines this at the level of the decision taken in the case at hand, as 
well as at the level of the relevant regulations, which ought to make 
44 See, e.g., ECtHR (inadm.) 17 Oct. 2000, Martinez Lopez v. Spain; ECtHR (inadm.) 
2 Dec. 2004, Falcon Rivera v Italy; ECtHR, 28 June 2007, Perez Arias v. Spain, § 25.
45 ECtHR, Perez Arias, o.c., § 25. If a high court however fails to do so, the Court 
generally finds a violation of Art. 6, § 1 ECHR, see e.g. ECtHR, 1 December 2005, 
Pa˘duraru v. Romania, § 98.
46 ECtHR (GC), Hatton, para. 128.
47 ECtHR (GC), Nachova, para. 103.
Addressing Multicultural Conflicts: An Emphasis on Procedural Fairness Eva Brems
Deusto Journal of Human Rights 
ISSN: 2530-4275 • ISSN-e: 2603-6002, No. 2/2017, p. 13-47 
42 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/djhr-2-2017pp13-47 • http://revista-derechoshumanos.deusto.es 
the use of firearms dependent on an assessment of the surrounding 
circumstances, and to require an evaluation of the nature of the 
offence of the threat.48
In assessing an asylum decision, the Court emphasized the fact 
that the personal circumstances of each applicant had been carefully 
considered in the light of a substantial body of material concerning 
the current situation in the country in question and the position of the 
relevant community within it.49
With respect to deprivation of an individual’s legal capacity, the 
Court states:
“Any deprivation or limitation of legal capacity must be based on 
sufficiently reliable and conclusive evidence. An expert medical 
report should explain what kind of actions the applicant is unable to 
understand or control and what the consequences of his illness are 
for his social life, health, pecuniary interests, and so on. The degree 
of the applicant’s incapacity should be addressed in sufficient detail 
by the medical reports”.50
5.2.2. imProVing ProcedurAl fAirness norms through emPiricAl inPut
From the confrontation between empirical procedural fairness 
scholarship and procedural fairness standards in human rights law, 
the most important conclusion is that, at least for those procedural 
fairness guarantees that correspond to the procedural fairness criteria 
in empirical scholarship (those relating to neutrality and participation), 
it would be highly advisable to extend guarantees beyond the limited 
settings for which they have been stipulated. For example, the 
intervention of the Minister in the “swimming pool” case (supra), 
creates a problem of what was described above as “neutrality”, in 
the sense that a person is treated as guilty a priori. If a judge instead 
of a Minister had deprived the man of his liberty in this manner, there 
would have been a violation of the presumption of innocence (article 6 
§ 2 ECHR). Yet this type of administrative procedures falls outside the 
scope of application of article 6 ECHR.
In addition, some crucial aspects for procedural fairness perceptions, 
as expressed in the concepts of respect and trustworthiness, may be 
48 Ibid., para. 104.
49 ECtHR, Vilvarajaha.o .v United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, para.114.
50 ECtHR, Sykora v. Czech Republic, 2012, para. 103.
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less related to formal aspects of procedures that can be captured in 
rules, than to human aspects, i.e. the conduct of the human beings 
that make up the relevant institutions. There is a category of gross 
violations on these grounds that can be captured by human rights 
law, yet beyond this limited category, shortcomings on these criteria 
remain below the normative radar. Gross violations of the criterion of 
respect, that affect the human dignity of individuals will in many cases 
qualify as “inhuman or degrading treatment” in the sense of article 3 
ECHR. In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, such 
violations have regularly been found on account of the authorities’ 
treatment of relatives of disappeared persons. The Court finds a 
violation when where “the failure of the authorities to respond to 
the quest for information by the relatives or the obstacles placed in 
their way, leaving them to bear the brunt of the efforts to uncover 
any facts, may be regarded as disclosing a flagrant, continuous and 
callous disregard of an obligation to account for the whereabouts 
and fate of a missing person.”51 In the context of multicultural 
conflicts, a case that in my opinion would fall within the scope of 
article 3 ECHR, is the above-mentioned “DJ Jos” case. The Travelers 
stated that they felt that they had been treated “like animals”. 
Indeed, there can be little doubt that the treatment they received is 
an infringement of their human dignity. In fact, loud music is a well-
known torture technique.52 The public outcry against the mayor of 
Landen and against the DJ was loud. Yet, when a minority rights 
NGO (Minderhedenforum) made an attorney submit an extensive 
file to the prosecutor’s office, arguing amongst others inhuman 
treatment, this remained without consequence. Unfortunately, it 
appears that even extreme cases of denial of procedural fairness to 
minorities may go without official recognition, let alone rectification 
or compensation.53
Thankfully, such extreme cases are rare. Yet that does not do 
away with the fact that in multicultural conflicts, as in many other 
fields, it regularly happens that approaches that do not formally 
violate any of the applicable procedural rules, nevertheless fall 
significantly short of procedural fairness standards. The facts in such 
cases are not serious enough to make up a human rights violation, 
51 ECtHR (GC), Varnava, para. 200.
52 Music is amongst others used to terrorize detainees in the Guantanamo 
detention center. 
53 Yet if this case had been submitted to the European Court of Human Rights, 
there is a good chance that a violation of article 3 ECHR would be found.
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yet will yield negative impact in terms of legitimacy, compliance, 
well-being and social cohesion. Remedying this can be done, to 
some extent, by the formulation of additional procedural rules 
(the responsibility of the legal department). Yet to the important 
extent that procedural fairness is contingent on human factors, 
procedural fairness will also be the responsibility of the human 
resources department: creating an environment that guarantees 
that people are treated with sincerity, caring and respect, is amongst 
others a function of an organisation’s staff selection process and of 
its training programme.
6. Concluding Comments
This paper has argued that procedural fairness concerns are 
central to the perceptions of unfairness that often result from 
authorities’ approaches to multicultural conflicts. Based on findings 
of social psychology scholarship, it has argued that there are good 
reasons to attempt to optimize procedural fairness in approaches to 
multicultural conflicts: this will benefit amongst others legitimacy, 
compliance, individual well-being and social cohesion. The paper also 
shows that this instrumental value of procedural fairness combines 
well with the traditional instrumental reason for valuing good 
process in (human rights) law, i.e. as a means to guarantee good 
outcomes. Indeed, the “burqa ban” case can serve as an illustration 
of how bad process results in bad law, in the sense that the effects 
of law counteract some of its stated goals. At the same time, this is 
also a clear example of how procedural unfairness negatively affects 
feelings of well-being and of inclusion in society. In a similar vein, it 
combines well with arguments of autonomous process value. The 
“DJ Jos” case shows similar negative effects of procedural unfairness 
at the individual and group level as the “burqa ban” case. At the 
same time, it also shows that bad process in itself can make up 
a very serious human rights violation, i.e. inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 
This paper has shown that, if one wants to draw normative 
conclusions from empirical findings on procedural fairness, these could 
fit well together with existing human rights standards on procedural 
fairness. However, they would need to apply across the board to all 
kinds of judicial, administrative and legislative processes. In addition, 
some of the most crucial guarantees of is in this story of central 
importance.
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